Theory of War and natural  resource rich countries

By john Blanshe Musinguzi

16^th November, 2013

The surrendering of M23 rebels to Ugandan government has prompted many DRC politicians to dream about peace in Democratic Republic of Congo. The rebels were led by their commander captain Makanga and it believed that about 1700 fighters have been disarmed and are being held in a secret place by Uganda’s government. Interestingly, DRC government was so excited to the extent that they refused to sign a peace agreement with rebels in state house Entebbe on 11^th November, 2013.

While both delegations-DRC government led by its foreign affairs minister, the M23 led by Mr Bertrand Bisimwa came and were present in state house, the DRC government delegation never entered room were the signing ceremony was to be conducted. Later they claimed that they wanted to further study in detail the final text of the agreement  to ensure that it conforms with what they negotiated…………, that is how the process to sign the agreement ended.

The question, can there be peace in democratic republic of Congo?

To partly answer this question, let us analyze the theory rich natural resource countries as a nexus to DRC.  

How natural resources affect the political system

It should be remembered that the core purpose of the state id to provide public goods. These goods and services can reasonably be considered non optional. However two can considered as Meta good-necessary rather than optional: accountability and security. Without them development is liable and frustrated.

In reference to security, the availability of natural resources and failure to transform for the embellishment of nationals is an epitome of civil conflicts especially when despite availability of resources, people continues to live in destitution. In such cases even without external aggression, national security will be internally threatened. This is because rebellions can be easily financed. In DRC, rebellions are order of the day since independence.

Rebellions produce a military response designed for internal repression of dissenting groups and does not induce nationalism. Such internal repression does not have the same properties of national building as an external threat.  When a nation is spending to deter external aggression and protect her citizens, such spending can be tolerated.

Natural resources prices and the incidence of war- the nexus

Basely and Persson investigate how changes in prices of natural resources affect incidence of civil war. They find that increase in prices significantly increases the incidence. Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom investigate the duration of civil war once they have started. They find that as price increases, chances that the war will be settled reduces. For as long as rebelling groups have access to natural resources, chances that they will talk peace diminish.

In such a situation, access and trade in natural resources provide opportunities for rebel’s predation during the conflict and so can finance the escalation and sustainability of war. Rebellions may further be motivated, rather merely being feasible, by the desire to capture the rents either during or after war. In Congo, probably M23 could have been motivated by desire to loot natural resources rather apolitical solution.

Government in countries endowed with natural resources tend to be less accountable to their citizens. In 1965 when lieutenant general Mobutu, by then commander in chief of the national army seized control of the country and declared him president. His regime was dominated by faltering national economy, corruption and notably his massive embezzlement of national resources for his personal use. No wonder by end of his regime his personal wealth was estimated to amount to 5billion US dollars.

Why and how do resources make government less accountable to their own people?

At the first before natural resource discovery and extraction, the objectives of government tend to be convincingly congruent with those of citizens. Things start falling apart as resource endowments begin to be discovered and extracted.

First of all, in a democratic state, natural resource may reduce the efficiency of electoral accountability. Government officials can some of the money to maintain power by means of patronage such as direct vote buying.

Secondly, natural resource rent might deteriorate the polity if they change the likelihood of democracy to dictatorship. In DRC, because of greed and self-aggrandizement of most presidents, interests of nationals have been divergent from those of their leaders.

Thirdly, in a shaky democratic state which is not far away from autocracy, resources rents have been used to benefit elites rather than the nationals. Furthermore resource rents might delay fundamental change of serious dysfunctional policies.

 To be continued: the role foreign states in Congo conflict since independence……………

John Blanshe Musinguzi Is a Journalism and Communication Student at Makerere University

Email: johnblanshe77m@gmail.com

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